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COMMENT 
THE DANGER OF A LABEL: 
HOW THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" CAN 
FRUSTRATE A TESTATOR'S WISH TO 
MAKE A GIFT TO PERSONAL FRIEND 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Jones was a widower who recently passed away at age eighty-
three. I He was an only child with no children, and his closest living 
relative was his cousin Richard, who lives in New York with his wife 
and family. Richard rarely contacted or visited Mr. Jones, and he did not 
even attend Mrs. Jones's funeral almost ten years ago. Mr. Jones slowed 
down considerably in his last few years. He was diagnosed with adult 
diabetes and could walk only with the support of a walker. He had to 
give up his driver's license and so was unable to drive himself to the 
doctor for appointments or to the drugstore to fill prescriptions. 
Cathy grew up next door to Mr. and Mrs. Jones and had a close, 
almost filial, relationship with them. After Mrs. Jones passed away, 
Cathy frequently visited with Mr. Jones in an effort to raise his spirits. 
As Mr. Jones slowed down with age, Cathy began helping him by doing 
his grocery shopping, bringing him meals, driving him to doctor's 
appointments and getting his prescriptions filled for him. Mr. Jones 
eventually gave her his power of attorney, so that she could also help him 
I Hypothetical derived from Conservatorship of Davidson, changing names, relationships 
and circumstances. See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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manage his finances. On his own initiative, Mr. Jones changed his will, 
leaving half of his estate to Cathy. Prior to this change, Mr. Jones's 
entire estate was to go to his cousin in New York. 
When Mr. Jones passed away, Cathy was shocked and touched that 
Mr. Jones remembered her so generously in his will. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Jones's cousin may be able to invalidate this transfer, simply by raising 
the sword of California Probate Code Section 21350.2 
Section 21350 provides a presumption of invalidity when an elder 
or dependent adult makes a donative transfer to his or her care 
custodian.3 The definition of "care custodian" has varied among 
California appellate courts, causing confusion within the legal profession 
as to what the term encompasses.4 The California Court of Appeal for 
the First Appellate District ("First District") held that a personal friend 
who provides caretaking services is excluded from the scope of the 
statute.5 Therefore, the transfer to Cathy would be valid in the First 
District.6 In contrast, the California Court of Appeal for the Second 
Appellate District ("Second District") recently rejected this definition 
and held that such friends are included in the term "care custodian.,,7 As 
a result, Cathy would receive nothing in the Second District, regardless 
of Mr. Jones's wishes.s 
The California Supreme Court recently granted review of the issue 
but has not yet reached a determination.9 However, this Comment 
asserts that despite how the court rules, the legislature should clarify the 
definition of "care custodian" to avoid complicated judicial analyses. 10 
A close review of the legislative history of the enactment and subsequent 
amendment of Section 21350 reveals that the intent of the legislature was 
to include only professional care custodians within the scope of its 
presumption of invalidity.ll Amending the statute's definition of "care 
custodian" would best clarify that only those in the business of providing 
care to elders or dependent adults are to be included within its reach.12 
Personal relationships that fall outside the scope of the statute would then 
2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005). 
3 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005). 
4 See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 87 -114 and accompanying text. 
6 [d. 
7 See infra notes 115-134 and accompanying text. 
S [d. 
9 Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. Sl36070, 120 
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005). 
10 See Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724; see also infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text. 
II See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text. 
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be governed by the traditional law of undue influence, which is better 
suited to a consideration of such relationships. 13 
Part I of this Comment examines the climate in which Section 
21350 was enacted, including a summary of the law that traditionally 
governed contests of testamentary transfers on the grounds of undue 
influence prior to the statute's enactment. 14 Part II argues that the 
statutory definition of "care custodian" should encompass only 
professional care custodians. 15 Part III supplies the textual amendments 
that should be made to provide sufficient clarification of the term's 
meaning. 16 Part IV concludes that the statute's amendment would 
continue to protect vulnerable elders or dependent adults from being 
taken advantage of by those with whom they have a fiduciary 
relationship, while simultaneously protecting their right to devise their 
estates according to their wishes and allowing for the reward of those 
who care for their ailing friends. 17 
I. SECTION 21350' S MODIFICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL LAW 
GOVERNING UNDUE INFLUENCE 
Before Section 21350 took effect in 1994/8 the long-standing rules 
of undue influence governed when a testamentary transfer was contested 
on the grounds of undue influence. 19 Section 21350 was enacted to make 
donative transfers to drafters of testamentary instruments presumptively 
invalid, shifting the burden of proving otherwise to the transferee.2o The 
statute was later modified to extend the presumption of invalidity to 
transfers made to care custodians of dependent adults.21 Due to 
conflicting interpretations of "care custodian" by California appellate 
courts,22 the current legal climate demands further amendment of the 
statute to clarify that only transfers to professional care custodians are 
13 See infra notes 166-190 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 18-134 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text. 
18 See Eric Bailey and Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at B I; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005). 
19 See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text. 
22 Compare Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702,710-18 (Ct. App. 2003) with 
Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 720-25 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. SI36070, 120 
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005); see also infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text. 
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subject to this presumption?3 
A. PRE-ST ATUTE LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
Prior to the enactment of Section 21350, the law of undue influence 
governed contests of testamentary transfers?4 The California Probate 
Code declares ineffective any testamentary provision that is procured by 
"duress, menace, fraud or undue influence.,,25 The burden of proving 
that a donative transfer was procured through one of these prohibited 
means lies with the contestant of the testamentary document.26 The 
proof presented by the contestant may be direct or circumstantial, but it 
must be substantial to negate a deceased person's will.27 Due to the 
common-law tradition of giving deference to the wishes of testators, 
courts are reluctant to invalidate the will of a deceased person?8 The 
provisions of a properly executed will are generally recognized as valid 
without regard to how others may think the testator could have or should 
have distributed his or her estate.29 
To prove undue influence in this context, a contestant must be able 
to show not only that the proponent of the will used his or her influence 
to secure its execution, but also that the influence exerted was equivalent 
to "coercion destroying free agency on the part of the testator.,,30 
Showing that the proponent had only a "mere opportunity to influence" 
or "mere general influence" is not sufficient to meet the contestant's 
burden of proof.31 The contestant must prove the influence used was 
such that it "overpower[ed] the volition of the testator and operate[d] 
directly on the testamentary act.,m Therefore, a very high burden of 
proof must be met for a court to hold a will invalid on the grounds of 
undue influence.33 
However, when a contestant can prove three specific elements 
23 See infra notes 135-190 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text. 
25 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6104 (Deering 2005). 
26 CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252 (Deering 2005). 
27 Estate of Williams, 221 P.2d 714, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (quoting Estate of Gleason, 
130 P. 872, 876 (Cal. 1913)). 
28 Estate of Fritschi, 384 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1963) (quoting In re McDevitt, 30 P. 10 I, 106 
(Cal. 1892). 
29 Id. 
30 Estate of Trefren, 194 P.2d 574,578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (quoting Estate of Easton, 35 
P.2d 614, 616-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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existed at the time of a will's execution, a rebuttable presumption of 
undue influence arises.34 The burden then shifts to the proponent of the 
testamentary document to prove no undue influence was exerted to 
procure its execution.35 The three elements a contestant must prove are 
that the testator had a confidential relationship with the proponent, the 
proponent actively participated in either the will's preparation or 
execution, and the terms of the will result in undue profit to the 
proponent.36 The standard of proof that must be met by the proponent in 
rebutting the presumption of undue influence is a preponderance of 
evidence,37 a relatively low standard, reflecting the long-standing 
reluctance at common law to negate a Will.38 These rules of undue 
influence governed all contests of testamentary transfers prior to the 
enactment of Section 21350, and they continue to apply when a 
transferee falls outside the scope of the statute.39 
B. CALIFORNIA PROBATE CODE SECTION 21350 
Section 21350 was enacted in 1993 (effective January 1, 1994), 
following a scandal in Orange County, California, where estate-planning 
attorney James D. Gunderson took advantage of his relationship with 
elderly clients by writing himself into their testamentary documents as a 
beneficiary or by giving himself discretionary power over distribution of 
their assets.40 The presumed invalidity of transfers made to drafters of 
testamentary documents, created by the statute, was expanded in 1997 
(effective January 1, 1998) to include other fiduciaries of dependent 
adults, including care custodians.41 
1. History and Enactment 
Following a year-long investigation of attorney James D. 
Gunderson, the Los Angeles Times published a report that revealed that 
Gunderson had drafted thousands of testamentary documents in which he 
was either left large bequests of money, was named executor or was 
given the authority to choose to which organizations his client's money 
34 Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990). 
35/d. 
36/d. 
37/d. 
38 See Frirschi, 384 P.2d at 659. 
39 See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 720-22 (Ct. App. 2003). 
40 See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text. 
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would gO.42 For example, one of his clients, Merrill A. Miller, changed 
his trust at age ninety-eight, with Gunderson's assistance, to leave $3.5 
million of his $18 million estate to Gunderson.43 This bequest came to 
Gunderson tax-free, because the document shifted the burden of paying 
estate taxes to the other beneficiaries.44 Furthermore, a no-contest clause 
was included in Miller's will and trust, so that any beneficiary who 
contested the instrument would automatically lose his or her share of the 
estate.45 
The expose of Gunderson received much attention and increased the 
general concern that fiduciaries closely positioned to the elderly may 
abuse their relationship.46 As a result, a movement began in the legal 
community to statutorily shift the burden of proof from the contestant of 
a testamentary instrument to the proponent by causing certain transferees 
to be presumptively disqualified.47 The Los Angeles Times report "was 
the catalyst for Assemblyman [Tom] Umberg to introduce Assembly Bill 
No. 21, December 7, 1992" for consideration by the California 
legislature.48 
The legislature responded to the heightened concern for the elderly 
by enacting Section 21350.49 The statute in its original form became law 
on January 1, 1994.50 It provided that a provision for a donative transfer 
to the drafter or transcriber of an instrument, including a will or trust, 
was presumptively invalid.51 The scope of invalidity stretched to 
42 Davan Maharaj, Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
1992, at AI. 
43 [d.; Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson; Merrill A. 
Miller, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A43; Davan Maharaj, Attorney Must Return Millions From 
Estate, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at AI. 
44 Davan Maharaj, 4 Clients Whose Estates Enriched James D. Gunderson; Merrill A. Miller, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,1992, at A43. 
45 [d. The use of no-contest clauses, such as the one used in the Miller trust, which make it 
impossible for beneficiaries to contest the validity of a testamentary document without risk of losing 
their own shares of the estate, was an issue of particular concern for the legislature. Brown v. Brown 
(In re Estate of Bryant), 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 762 (CI. App. 1996) (Work, Acting P.J., dissenting); 
The Orange County Superior Court issued a judgment ordering Gunderson to return the $3.5 million 
bequest, plus $500,000 interest, to the heirs of Merrill A. Miller. Davan Maharaj, Attorney Must 
Return Millions From Estate, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at AI. 
46 Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 (Work, Acting P.J., dissenting). 
47/d. 
48 [d. 
49 Eric Bailey and Davan Maharaj, Wilson Signs Bill to Protect Estates of the Elderly, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, at B I. 
50/d. 
51 Legislative Counsel's Digest, Assemb. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca. gOY /pu b/93-94/bill/asml ab _000 1-0050/ab _21_ bi 11_930802_ chaptered (last 
visited February 9,2006). 
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encompass all those who were active in causing the instrument to be 
drafted or transcribed, as well as any relative or business associate of the 
drafter or transcriber. 52 
In Graham v. Lenzi, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth 
Appellate District discussed the legislature's rationale in making such 
transfers presumptively invalid.53 The court determined that the 
legislature was motivated by an awareness that an inherent danger 
existed that those who are "uniquely positioned to procure gifts from 
elderly persons through fraud, menace, duress or undue influence" may 
take advantage of their position to the detriment of trustors and 
testators.54 Reflecting this observation made in Graham v. Lenzi, the 
First District added in Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled 
Children's Foundation that the section was passed "to prevent 
unscrupulous persons in fiduciary relationships from obtaining gifts from 
elderly persons through undue influence or other overbearing 
behavior.,,55 
This shift in the burden of proof from the contestant of a donative 
transfer to its proponent significantly changed the traditional law of 
undue influence.56 The change reflected the climate of concern regarding 
the vulnerability of elderly people, in addition to concern that contestants 
of testamentary transfers were heavily burdened by the high level of 
proof required of them at common law to invalidate such transfers on the 
ground of undue influence.57 
2. 1997 Amendment 
In 1997 (effective January 1, 1998), the legislature expanded the 
presumption of invalidity of Section 21350 to include donative transfers 
made to a transferor's care custodian.58 The amendment was sponsored 
by the Estate Planning, Trust & Probate Law Section of the State Bar of 
California. 59 In moving for an expansion of the presumption of 
52 1d. 
53 Graham v. Lenzi, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 1995). 
54 1d. 
55 Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children's Found., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 120 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
56 See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. 
57 See Bank of America, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121. Another significant result of the statutory 
presumption of invalidity was that the initiation of a proceeding attacking the validity of a 
testamentary document in such situations could no longer be hindered by an intimidating no-contest 
clause. Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 (Work, Acting P.I., dissenting). 
58 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005). 
59 See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Sen. 
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invalidity, the amendment's proponents wished to encompass "practical 
nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care," in addition to 
the "lawyers or other fiduciaries" already included in the scope of the 
statute.60 Thus, the current form of Section 21350 was born.61 
Accordingly, the statute now mandates that a presumption of invalidity 
shall be ascribed to testamentary transfers made by a dependent adult to 
his or her care custodian.62 
The statutory definition of a "care custodian" is found in Section 
15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.63 This section 
defines a care custodian as 
an administrator or an employee of any of the following public or 
private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for 
elders or dependent adults, including members of the support staff and 
maintenance staff. 64 
Specific types of agencies, clinics, and facilities follow this definition, 
which concludes with a final catchall provision incorporating "any other 
protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or 
advocacy agency or person providing health services or social services 
to elders or dependent adults.,,65 The portions of the "care custodian" 
definition italicized above created ambiguity as to whether individuals 
who care for friends are included, and those provisions have spurred 
confusion and inconsistency of application of Section 21350 among 
California appellate courtS.66 
Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98Ibilllasmlab_1151-
1200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2(06). 
60 See Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 
4, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98Ibilllasmlab_1151-
1200/ab_II723fa_19970723_15251O_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2006); see also 
Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
61 CAL. PRos. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005). 
62 CAL. PROS. CODE § 21350(a)(6) (Deering 2005). 
63 CAL. PRos. CODE § 21350(c) (Deering 2005). 
64 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 156 1O.l7 (Deering 2005) (emphasis added); see also Bernard 
v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 721-22 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. S136070, 120 P.3d 1050 
(Cal. Sep. 21, 2005) (analyzing the definition); see also Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 702, 710-12 (Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the significance of the definition's text). 
65 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1561O.17(a)-(y) (Deering 2005); see also Bernard, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 721-22 (analyzing the provision); see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710-13 
(discussing the significance of the definition's text). 
66 See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text. 
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3. Exceptions to the Presumption of Invalidity 
The legislature has recognized exceptions to the presumption of 
invalidity created by Section 21350.67 A transfer that satisfies any of the 
exceptions enumerated in California Probate Code Section 21351 falls 
outside the scope of presumed invalidity.68 
First, the legislature excluded family members from the 
presumption by providing an exception for those related to the transferor 
by blood or marriage, including a cohabitant or registered domestic 
partner of the transferor.69 The term "related by blood or marriage" 
encompasses those who are related to the transferor within five degrees 
of kinship.7o This creates a wide sphere of exclusion, in that it extends to 
a transferor's great -great-great -grandchildren, great-great -great-
grandparents, great-grand uncles and aunts, great-grand nephews and 
nieces, and first cousins once removed. 71 Section 21350, therefore, 
applies only to transfers between unrelated or distantly related 
individuals who are not cohabitants or registered domestic partners.72 
Second, a Certificate of Independent Review may be obtained at the 
time a donative provision to a prohibited transferee is executed.73 Should 
a contest of the transfer subsequently arise, this document may be used to 
rebut the presumption of invalidity otherwise imposed by Section 
21350.74 The Certificate of Independent Review is a written declaration 
that must be made by an attorney independent from the person who 
drafted the donative instrument, at the time a provision for a prohibited 
transferee is executed.75 The Certificate states that the attorney has 
counseled the client (i.e., the transferor) for the purpose of determining 
whether the purported transfer was the result of fraud, menace, duress, or 
undue influence, and has come to the conclusion that it was not.76 A 
67 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (Deering 2005). 
68/d. 
69 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(a) (Deering 2005). 
70 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (g) (Deering 2005). 
71 JOELC. DOSRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS CASES 
AND MATERIALS 67 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 2d ed. 2003) (1998) (providing 
the Table of Consanguinity to illustrate the degrees of kinship within a family). 
72 CAL. PROS. CODE § 21351 (a), (g) (Deering 2005). 
73 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (b) (Deering 2005). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. A point that may warrant re-evaluation by the legislature is the advantage of requiring 
that an independent attorney execute a Certificate of Independent Review. Id. This was a logical 
requirement when Section 21350 was in its original form, meaning the prohibited transferee was the 
drafter of the testamentary document, because a conflict of interest existed. Legislative Counsel's 
Digest, Assemb. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.). available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-
9
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drafting attorney who knows that a client's intended beneficiary is within 
the group presumptively disqualified by Section 21350 has a duty to 
advise that the client obtain a Certificate of Independent Review.77 
Third, a court order may be obtained validating a donative transfer 
if its proponent presents clear and convincing evidence that the transfer 
was not the product of fraud, menace, duress or undue influence.78 The 
rules governing the pursuit of such a court order are quite stringent.79 
The evidence used may not be based solely on the testimony of any 
person listed in Section 21350(a) of the California Probate Code,so 
namely: the drafter of the instrument; any partner, shareholder or 
employee of a law partnership or corporation the drafter has an interest 
in; fiduciaries of the transferor; and a care custodian of a transferor who 
is a dependent adult.S! Included within the scope of "drafter," 
"fiduciary" and "care custodian" are any of such person's employees or 
relations by blood or marriage (including a cohabitant or registered 
domestic partner).S2 The required clear-and-convincing standard of proof 
is much higher than the "preponderance of evidence" necessary to rebut 
a presumption of invalidity at common law.s3 This is consistent with the 
legislative intent that a rebuttal of a Section 21350 presumption of 
invalidity be much more difficult for persons who fall within its scope.S4 
94/biIIJasmJab_0001-0050/ab_21_biIC930802_chaptered (last visited February 9,2006). But when 
the designated transferee is the client's care custodian, is the drafter not in the same position as an 
independent attorney, if not a better position, to make a judgment as to the circumstances of the 
transfer, similar to a capacity judgment? See generally Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., I CALIFORNIA 
WILLS & TRUSTS § 11.03 (2005) (discussing testamentary capacity). If a client and the estate-
planning attorney have a continuous relationship pursuant to which the client has returned seeking an 
amendment of his or her testamentary documents, that attorney may in fact be in a much better 
position than outside counsel to determine whether a purported transfer is the result of undue 
influence. 
77 Osnorio v. Weingarten, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246,266-67 (Ct. App. 2004). However, a testator 
may create a holographic will without seeking the counsel of an attorney. See generally Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc., I CALIFORNIA WILLS & TRUSTS § 11.08 (2005). Such a testator may be 
unaware of Section 21350's presumption of invalidity, and a transfer to a disqualified recipient could 
be invalidated if contested. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (Deering 2005); see also Estate of 
McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10,24 (Ct. App. 2004). 
78 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(e) (Deering 2005). This option is unavailable, however, if the 
transferee is the drafter of the testamentary instrument. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(e)(I) (Deering 
2005). 
79 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
80 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(d) (Deering 2(05). 
81 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a) (Deering 2(05). 
82 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(a)(2), (5), (7) (Deering 2005). 
83 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990). 
84 See Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children's Found., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 
121 (Ct. App. 1999). In addition, the presumption does not apply to bequests under $3,000 (but only 
if the transferor's total estate is in excess of the amount provided by California Probate Code Section 
10
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C. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" IN 
CALIFORNIA ApPELLATE COURTS 
The California appellate courts' conflicting interpretations of the 
definition of "care custodian" under Section 21350 has resulted in 
confusion among the legal community regarding the scope of its 
meaning.85 The principal component of the definition at issue is whether 
the term is meant to encompass both those who care for dependent adults 
out of a personal relationship and those who professionally provide such 
care and are hired for that purpose.86 
1. Conservatorship of Davidson and the First Appellate District of 
California 
The First District held that a care custodian whose relationship with 
a dependent adult has grown from purely professional roots is the type of 
relationship addressed by Section 21350.87 In Conservatorship of 
Davidson, a personal friendship with a dependent adult evolved into one 
of caretaking.88 The question presented was whether such a friend was to 
be included in the presumption of invalidity created by Section 21350.89 
In holding that the statute was not meant to encompass personal 
relationships, the court reasoned it would be bad public policy to 
"punish" those who care for the elderly for charitable and personal 
reasons.90 
In Davidson, decedent Dolores Davidson was the close friend of 
Stephen Gungl for almost forty years.91 Mrs. Davidson and her husband, 
when he was alive, had frequently socialized with Gungl and his life 
partner Howard Holtz over the years, spending numerous celebratory 
occasions and holidays together.92 As Davidson ailed and declined with 
age, Gungl and Holtz provided her with increasing amounts of 
assistance, which included cooking, shopping, and driving her to perform 
13100) or to instruments executed by nonresidents of California, unless the instrument was signed in 
California or the transferor was a California resident at the time of execution. See CAL. PRos. CODE 
§ 21351 (h), (i) (Deering 2005). 
85 See infra notes 87-134 and accompanying text. 
86 [d. 
87 Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 715-16 (Ct. App. 2003). 
88 [d. at 705-10. 
89 [d. at 704-05. 
90 [d. at 713. 
91 [d. at 705. 
92 [d. 
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errands or to get to appointments, such as those with her doctor.93 
Davidson eventually gave Gungl her power of attorney so that Gungl 
could also maintain her finances.94 
Davidson ultimately revoked her original will, which had provided 
for the bulk of her estate to go to her cousin Elaine Morken and her 
cousin's husband Cal Morken, her closest living relatives.95 Her original 
will also provided for several specific bequests to other individuals, 
including a $1,000 gift to Gung1.96 In the new testamentary documents 
Davidson executed, she left the bulk of her estate to Gung!, with only a 
nominal $5,000 bequest to the Morkens.97 Following Davidson's death, 
Cal Morken contested the gift to Gungl,98 claiming it was invalid due to 
the care custodial nature of Gungl' s relationship with Davidson.99 
The court disagreed with Morken's contention that Section 21350 
was meant to encompass caretaking provided in connection with a 
personal relationship.loo Instead, the court interpreted the enumeration of 
public agencies and private professional organizations and individuals 
listed in Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions 
Code as implying only the occupational provision of caretaking services 
was to be affected by the statute.101 Thus, the court held that only those 
who provide care as part of "the professional or occupational provision 
of health or social services" are to be included within the scope of the 
statute. 102 
In addition, the court created a test to determine whether a 
caregiving relationship is primarily personal or professional. 103 
According to this test, the key issue in analyzing a care custodian 
relationship is determining whether the provision of health and social 
services or the personal relationship existed first. 104 The court provided 
three factors that must be weighed to make this determination: "(1) the 
length of time the individuals had a personal relationship before 
assuming the roles of caregiver and recipient; (2) the closeness and 
93 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 705. 
94 [d. at 706. 
95 [d. at 705-07. Davidson was an only child. /d. at 705. Her husband passed away in the 
late 1970's, and they had no children. [d. 
96 [d. at 705. 
97 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 707. 
98 [d. at 709-10. Elaine Morken passed away on January 15,2000. ld at 705. 
99 ld. at 709-10. 
100 ld. at 704-05. 
101 [d. at 711-12; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (Deering 2005). 
102 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715 (emphasis added). 
103 [d. at 716. 
104 [d. 
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authenticity of the personal relationship; and (3) whether any money was 
paid for the provision of care.,,105 
The court determined that an analysis of these factors showed that 
the relationship between Gungl and Davidson was personal and excluded 
from the reach of Section 21350.106 It reasoned that the two had been 
friends for almost forty years, and the genuine nature of their friendship 
was clear.107 Any money paid to Gungl was reimbursement for expenses 
related to care that he had expended, not compensation for his 
services. 108 
Because Section 21350 was not triggered, the court then examined 
whether Cal Morken, as the contesting beneficiary, had met the burden 
of proving that the transfer was the result of duress, menace, fraud or 
undue influence, pursuant to the traditional rules of undue influence. 109 
The court found that he had not made a showing that the three necessary 
elements creating a presumption of undue influence existed. I 10 Although 
Gungl and Davidson had a relationship that qualified as confidential, 
Morken had shown neither active participation in the execution of the 
testamentary documents nor undue profit. III Contacting the drafter of 
Davidson's trust and being present at the initial meeting did not 
constitute active participation in its execution on Gung}' s part. ll2 
Additionally, after considering the duration of Gungl and Davidson's 
friendship and the tremendous amount of care Gungl had provided to her, 
in contrast with the little interest the Morkens had taken in Davidson, no 
undue profit to Gungl was shown.113 Therefore, the court held that 
Gungl had not unduly influenced Davidson, and the testamentary 
provisions Davidson had made for his benefit were affirmed as valid. 114 
2. Bernard v. Foley and the Second Appellate District of California 
In contrast, the Second District declined to apply the test created by 
the Davidson court to determine whether a caretaking relationship had 
derived from a primarily personal or professional relationship.115 In 
105 ld. 
l06 ld. at 716-18. 
107 ld. at7l7-18. 
108 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 716-17. 
109 ld. at 720-22; see also supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. 
110 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22; see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
III Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721-22. 
112ld at 721. 
113 /d. at 721-22. 
114/d. at 722. 
115 Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 723-24 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. 
13
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Bernard v. Foley, after a consideration of legislative intent and a strict 
reading of Sections 21350 and 21351, the court broadly defined "care 
custodian" to include all those who provide health services to the elderly 
or dependent adults, regardless of the personal or professional nature of 
their relationship, by focusing on the provision of health services. I 16 
The Bernard court partially based its holding on the portion of 
Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare & Institutions Code that 
includes a catchall definition of care custodian as "persons providing 
care or services for elders or dependent adults.,,117 The court concluded 
that a strict reading of Section 21350, and the fact that specific 
exemptions are made to the rule in Section 21351, implies the exclusion 
of any other exception. l1S The court determined that "[h ]ad the 
Legislature wished to exempt preexisting friends from the definition of 
care custodian, it would have done so," and it was not the role of the 
courts to "usurp the legislative function" and expand the law in such a 
way. 119 
In Bernard, the decedent, Carmel L. Bosco, was also a widow with 
no children. 12o During the last two months of her life, Bosco lived with 
her nephew's ex-wife, Ann Erman, and Erman's boyfriend, James 
Foley.121 Three days before Bosco passed away, she amended her trust 
to designate Erman and Foley as equal beneficiaries of the trust 
residue. 122 Prior to that time, no provision had been made for either 
Erman or Foley in the trust. 123 The beneficiaries whose interests in 
Bosco's estate were reduced or eliminated as a result of the amendment 
contested its validity. 124 
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the significance of 
including the term "practical nurse" in the Senate Commentary on the 
Assembly Bill for the enactment of Section 21350(a)(6) of the California 
Probate Code.125 The record showed that Erman and Foley assisted 
S136070, 120 P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005). 
116 [d. at 722-24. 
117 [d. at 722; CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 156IO.l7(y) (Deering 2005). 
lIS Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 724. 
119 1d. 
120 [d. at718. 
121 [d. 
122 1d. 
123 Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 718. 
124 ld at 718-19. 
125 [d. at 720 (quoting Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 
2003»; Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, 
available at hnp:/Iwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasmJab_1151-
12oo/ab_1172_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.html (last visited February 9, 2006). 
14
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Bosco with numerous tasks, including meal preparation, cleaning and 
helping her with daily personal hygiene maintenance. 126 Erman also 
administered oral medications and topical medicines to wounds on the 
decedent's legs. 127 The court held that the provision of such "health 
services" elevated the level of caretaking to that of a professional 
practical nurse. 128 Therefore, Erman and Foley fell within Section 
21350' s presumption of undue influence. 129 Since they did not present 
clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption, the 
testamentary provision made for their benefit was held invalid. 130 
The Bernard court also distinguished Davidson, in which the 
assistance provided by the beneficiary basically consisted of cooking, 
shopping, driving and providing financial services, and did not constitute 
"health services" of a medical nature. l3l But the definition of "care 
custodian" provided by Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare & 
Institutions Code includes in pertinent part the provision of "health 
services or social services.,,132 In focusing its decision on the health 
services Erman provided to Bosco, the Bernard court did not specifically 
address whether services similar to those in Davidson would fall within 
the scope of "social services," likewise making Section 21350 
applicable. 133 However, its vehement rejection of Davidson's 
preexisting-personal-relationship exception strongly suggests that the 
Bernard court would have held someone like Gungl to be a care 
custodian within the scope of Section 21350. 134 
II. THE NEED TO AMEND THE DEFINITION OF "CARE CUSTODIAN" TO 
INCLUDE ONLY PROFESSIONALS 
Currently, there is no clear standard that may be relied upon 
regarding the correct definition of "care custodian.,,135 Conflicting 
interpretations by California appellate courts reveal this ambiguity.136 A 
126 Bernard. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722. 
127 1d. 
128/d. 
129/d. at 725-26. 
130 1d. 
131 /d. at 724-25. 
132 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17(y) (Deering 2005) (emphasis added). 
133 Bernard. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-26. 
134/d. at 723-24. The California Supreme Court has granted review of the decision reached in 
Bernard, but has not yet reached a determination. Bernard v. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Cl. App. 
2005), rev. granted. No. S136070, 120 P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005). 
135 See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text. 
136 1d. 
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close scrutiny of the statute and the legislative intent behind its 
enactment support the First District's conclusion and its interpretation 
that only transfers to professional caregivers are regulated by this 
section.137 To resolve the uncertainty, the text of the statutory definition 
of "care custodian" should be amended to include only professional 
caregivers and their employees. 138 Personal friends who become 
caregivers of the elderly or dependent adults should be excluded from the 
scope of the definition because (1) it was the legislature's original intent 
to include only professional caregivers,139 and (2) the traditional law of 
undue influence is better suited to govern personal caregiving 
relationships that fall outside the intended scope of the statute. 140 
A. THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO INCLUDE PERSONAL 
FRIENDS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF "CARE CUSTODIAN." 
A close reading of both the proposal for legislation 141 and analysis 
regarding the Assembly Bill for the enactment of section 21350(a)(6) of 
the California Probate Code142 suggests an intent to include only 
professional caregivers, and not personal caregivers, in the statutory 
definition of "care custodian.,,143 A key element of the analysis is the 
inclusion of the term "practical nurse" in legislative documents. l44 The 
court in Bernard suggested that the term "practical nurse" may refer to 
an unlicensed individual who administers medicines and provides health 
services. 145 However, the general meaning of the term, as well as the 
context in which it is used in both the proposal and analysis, indicates it 
137 See Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 710-16 (Ct. App. 2003); see also 
infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text. 
140 See infra notes 166-190 and accompanying text. 
141 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & 
Prob. Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on 
Judiciary legislative bill file. 
142 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 7\3; see also Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, comm. on 
Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-
98IbiIVasmlab_1151-1200/ab_II723fa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.htrnl (last visited February 
9,2006). 
143 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 712-13. 
144 [d.; see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720 (quoting Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713); 
see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob. Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. 
Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on judiciary legislative bill file; see also Sen. Comm. 
on JUdiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97 -98Ibill/asmlab_1151-
1200:ab_II72_cfa_19970723_15251O_sen30mm.html (last visited February 9,2006). 
145 Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722-25. 
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was used to convey a professional relationship.146 
The proponents of adding care custodians to Section 21350's list of 
presumptively disqualified transferees emphasized the term "practical 
nurse" in articulating the purpose and application of the proposed 
amendment. 147 Concern was expressed that the elderly or other 
dependent adults may be taken advantage of by those in the "industry" 
who were determined to be "practical nurses.,,148 The amendment's 
proponents felt that including care custodians within Section 21350's 
presumption of invalidity would "prevent the growing 'cottage industry' 
of 'practical nurses' from successfully taking advantage of dementing 
elders" by eliminating the incentive to do SO.149 Use of the word 
"industry" has a business connotation that indicates an intent by the 
proponents of the Bill for the amendment to apply to those who are in the 
business of being practical nurses, as opposed to those who provide 
medical care in the course of personal caregiving.150 
Furthermore, the general meaning ascribed to the term "practical 
nurse" has a professional connotation. 151 Two dictionaries provide the 
definition of a "practical nurse" as either (1) a "licensed practical nurse" 
or (2) a "person who has had practical experience in nursing care but 
who is not a graduate of a degree program in nursing.,,152 Although the 
second part of this definition could be read to allow for the inclusion of 
individuals such as Ann Erman in Bernard, who administered oral 
medications and topical medicines to wounds on the decedent Carmel L. 
Bosco's legs,153 another dictionary resolves this uncertainty by defining a 
"practical nurse" as "a nurse who cares for the sick professionally 
146 See infra notes 147·165; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
147 Davidson. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob. 
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172. excerpted from Senate Comm. on 
Judiciary legislative bill file. 
148 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713; see also Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob. 
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on 
Judiciary legislative bill file. 
149 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713 (quoting Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, Trust & Prob. 
Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assemb. Bill No. 1172, excerpted from Senate Comm. on 
Judiciary legislative bill file) (emphasis added). 
150 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
151 See infra notes 152·155 and accompanying text. 
152 "Practical Nurse," THE AMERICAN HERITAGE® DICfIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(Joseph P. Pickett et aI., eds., Houghton Mifflin Co. 4th ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9. 2006); "Practical 
Nurse." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE® STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICfIONARY (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2d 
ed. 2002). available at http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=practical%20nurse (last visited 
February 9, 2006). 
153 Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722. 
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without having the training or experience required of a registered 
nurse.,,154 An additional source classifies a practical nurse as "a nurse 
who has enough training to be licensed by a state to provide routine care 
for the sick.,,155 When these definitions provided by various general 
dictionaries are taken as a whole, it appears that the generally accepted 
definition of a "practical nurse" is one who provides nursing services 
professionally. 156 
Additionally, programs for the acqulSltlOn of practical nursing 
degrees are offered by a variety of educational institutions. 157 The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics in the U.S. Department of Labor, in a report 
issued on the occupational outlook of licensed practical nurses, describes 
a licensed practical nurse ("LPN") as one who "care[s] for the sick, 
injured, convalescent, and disabled under the direction of physicians and 
registered nurses.,,158 Such nurses provide basic care such as monitoring 
their patients, administering medications and aiding with personal 
activities. 159 It is noteworthy that in the report, the term "practical nurse" 
is used interchangeably with "licensed practical nurse," or "LPN," 
indicating that a reference to a "practical nurse" has the same 
professional connotation. 160 
In the analysis prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee 
regarding the Assembly Bill for the enactment of Section 21350(a)(6) of 
the California Probate Code, the proponents of the bill expressed a desire 
to extend the scope of the statute by making donative transfers to 
154 "Practical Nurse," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY (Merriam-
Webster, Inc. Revised ed. 2002), available at 
http://www.dictionary.comlsearch?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
155 "Practical Nurse," WORDNET@ 2.0 (Princeton University 2003), available at 
http://www.dictionary.comlsearch?q=practical%20nurse (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
156 See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text. 
157 See Degree-Site.com, Index of Schools for Practical Nursing, available at 
http://www.degree-site.comlmedicaLhealthcareipractical_nursing.html(last visited February 9, 
2006). 
158 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos102.htm (last visited February 9,2006); see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 722. 
159 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos102.htm (last visited February 9,2006); see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 722. 
160 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, 2004-05 Edition, Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl02.htm (last visited February 9, 2006). 
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"practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care" 
presumptively invalid. 161 Taken in context, the phrase strongly suggests 
usage of the term "practical nurse" in a professional sense. 162 The text in 
the analysis specifically states "practical nurses or other caregivers hired 
to provide in-home care.'.163 The use of the words "or other" indicates 
that practical nurses are considered hired caregivers. l64 This reveals 
legislative intent that those hired and paid to provide care to the elderly 
or dependent adults be included in the scope of the presumption of 
invalidity. 165 
B. THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IS BETTER SUITED 
TO GOVERN TRANSFERS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSONAL 
CAREGIVER RELATIONSHIPS. 
If the circumstances surrounding a donative transfer left to a friend 
are suspect, the traditional law of undue influence provides sufficient 
recourse to a contestant. 166 These long-standing laws are much better 
suited to govern a personal caregiver relationship than the automatic 
presumption of invalidity created by Section 21350. 167 They provide for 
simultaneous protection of both the right of the decedent to devise his or 
her estate as he or she sees fit and the rights of a natural beneficiary.168 
Testamentary provisions procured by duress, menace, fraud or 
undue influence are ineffective. 169 A contestant has the burden of 
proving undue influencel70 but may shift the burden of proof to the 
proponent of the testamentary provision if the contestant is able to show 
(1) a confidential relationship between the transferor and beneficiary, (2) 
active participation on the part of the beneficiary in the execution of the 
161 Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Ct. App. 2003); Sen. Comm. on 
Judiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasm/ab_IISI-
1200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_IS2SIO_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9,2006). 
162 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 712-13. 
163 Sen. Comm. on JUdiciary, comm. on Assemb. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4, 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/billJasm/ab_IISI-
1200/ab_II72_cfa_19970723_IS2SIO_sen_comm.html (last visited February 9, 2006) (emphasis 
added); see Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
text. 
164 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
165 1d. at 712-13. 
166 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22; see also supra notes 24-39 and accompanying 
167 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22. 
168 / d. 
169 CAL. PROS. CODE § 6104 (Deering 200S). 
170 CAL. PROS. CODE § 82S2 (Deering 200S). 
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testamentary document, and (3) undue profit to the beneficiary.17I 
A personal relationship in which a friend provides some care of 
either a financial or medical nature to a dependent adult is included in the 
scope of a "confidential relationship.,,172 In Estate of Chesney, neighbors 
began to assist the decedent when she became incapacitated as a result of 
two strokes and a sprained ankle, and they later entered into an 
agreement with the decedent that they would care for her for the rest of 
her life in return for the deed to her house. 173 The court held that these 
neighbors had a confidential relationship with the decedent. 174 In Estate 
of Wright, a neighboring long-time friend was considered to have had a 
confidential relationship with the decedent because she provided services 
such as shopping, driving, administration of shots and payment of bills, 
and was a joint tenant in the decedent's house and bank account. 175 
Similarly, after determining that Section 21350 did not apply, the court 
in Davidson held that by virtue of the nature of the assistance Gungl 
provided to Davidson, their friendship amounted to a confidential 
relationship. 176 Thus, concerns regarding vulnerability that may result 
from such a relationship are already met. 177 
However, under the traditional rules, the burden to disprove undue 
influence will not shift to such a friend unless the other two elements are 
also met: (1) the friend played an active role in the execution of a 
testamentary document from which he or she would benefit, and (2) the 
friend unduly profited from the transfer. 178 As discussed above, the court 
in Davidson found that these elements had not been met; therefore, the 
contesting beneficiary had not met his burden of proof and the trust was 
valid.179 The court in Estate of Wright also concluded that the remaining 
two elements had not been shown to exist and held the contested 
instrument to be valid. 180 
By contrast, in Estate of Chesney, the court found that the neighbors 
played an active role in the procurement of the contested will because 
Mrs. Bosworth not only was present at the signing of the will but had 
171 See Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990); see also supra notes 34-38 
and accompanying text. 
172 See, e.g., Estate of Chesney, 228 P.2d 46, 47-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); see also, e.g., Estate 
of Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (Ct. App. 1963). 
173 Chesney, 228 P.2d at 47-48. 
174 [d. at 48. 
175 Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 6-8. 
176 Conservatorship of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 721 (Ct. App. 2003). 
177 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22. 
178 [d.; see Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1990). 
179 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 722; see supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text. 
180 Wright, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 8-10. 
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dictated the terms to an attorney who never consulted personally with the 
decedent. 181 The court additionally found that the neighbors had unduly 
profited to the exclusion of the decedent's relatives, satisfying the third 
element. 182 The satisfaction of all three elements resulted in a finding of 
undue influence that invalidated the will in question. 183 
These examples demonstrate that the traditional law of undue 
influence protects personal friends to whom a decedent may wish to 
make a testamentary gift, while also providing protection to the decedent 
and other beneficiaries in the case of a suspect personal relationship.184 
It is logical to presume that no undue influence was involved when a 
friend exercised no power over how a testator chose to devise his or her 
property. This is a reasonable conclusion because the actions of the 
friend were completely independent from the drafting of any 
testamentary document. Likewise, if evidence is presented that a 
genuine friendship existed between a proponent of a will and an elder or 
dependent adult to whom the proponent provided attentive care, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a transfer to such a friend did not constitute 
undue profit, especially if someone who would appear to be a more 
natural object of the elder's bounty and affection took no interest in the 
elder. 185 
Furthermore, as noted in Estate of Fritschi, "the right to dispose of 
one's property by will is most solemnly assured by law, and ... does not 
depend upon its judicious use.,,186 In Davidson, the court expressed 
concern that the imposition of "burdensome technical and procedural 
barriers on the ability of elderly individuals to recognize and reward 
services performed for them in their declining years by close personal 
friends, intimates and companions" would be the result of an inclusion of 
such individuals within the scope of Section 21350. 187 The court 
reasoned that this would essentially serve as punishment to those who 
had committed "self-sacrificing acts of care and companionship," as well 
as a limit on the fundamental right to testamentary disposition. 188 
Because the traditional law of undue influence provides a scheme 
181 Chesney, 228 P.2d at 48. 
182 1d. at 47-49. 
183 /d. at 47 and 49. 
184 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720-22. 
185 See Estate of Williams, 221 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); see also Wright, 33 
Cal. Rptr. at 9-10; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721-22. 
186 Estate of Fritschi, 384 P.2d 656,659 (Cal. 1963) (quoting In re McDevitt, 30 P. 101, 106 
(Cal. 1892)). 
187 Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 713. 
188 [d.; see also Fritschi, 384 P.2d at 659. 
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that better suits the situation in which a contestant questions a transfer 
resulting from a personal caregiver relationship, such personal friends 
should not be included within the automatic presumption of Section 
21350. 189 This approach prevents encroachment upon the hallowed right 
f d . th· th· h 190 o testators to eVlse elr estates as ey WIS . 
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "CARE 
CUSTODIAN" 
Section 21350 uses the definition of "care custodian" provided by 
Section 15610.17 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 191 
Section 15610.17 currently begins by stating: 
"Care custodian" means an administrator or an employee of any of the 
following public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing 
care or services for elders or dependent adults, including members of 
the support staff and maintenance staff. 192 
Ambiguity as to the scope of this definition would be resolved by 
shifting part of the text and adding the words "hired to provide," to read 
as follows: 
"Care custodian" means an administrator or an employee of any of the 
following public or private facilities or agencies, including members 
of the support staff and maintenance staff, or other persons hired to 
provide care or services for elders or dependent adults. 
This change would clarify that the definition encompasses only those 
individuals who are in the occupation of providing caretaking services. 
Following the enumeration of various public and private facilities 
and agencies,193 the catchall provision at the end of the code section 
should likewise be modified to resolve ambiguity. It currently includes 
within the definition of "care custodian": 
Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health or private 
assistance or advocacy agency or person providing health services or 
189 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714-15 and 720-22. 
190 [d.; see also Fritschi, 384 P.2d at 659. 
191 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(c) (Deering 2005). 
192 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610.17 (Deering 2005). 
193 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610. 17(a)-(x) (Deering 2005). 
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social services to elders or dependent adults. 194 
However, the addition of the words "who is hired" would limit the scope 
of the definition to exclude a personal friend who provides care to an 
elder or dependent adult. Subpart (y) of Section 15610.17 should 
therefore read as follows: 
Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health or private 
assistance or advocacy agency or person who is hired to provide 
health services or social services to an elder or dependent adult. 
These two changes to the text of Section 15610.17 of the California 
Welfare and Institutions Code would provide for consistency in 
application among California courts by clarifying that only professional 
individuals, hired for the purpose of providing care to an elder or 
dependent adult, are to be included within the scope of the "care 
custodian" definition. 195 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In expanding Section 21350's presumption of invalidity to include 
"care custodians," the legislature has created an ambiguity as to whom 
the term encompasses. 196 This ambiguity has manifested itself in the 
conflicting decisions of California appellate courts. 197 The First 
District's holding that only professional care custodians are included 
within the statute's scope is in direct contrast with the Second District's 
view that personal friends who provide care are also included. 198 The 
California Supreme Court has granted a petition for review of the 
decision reached by the Second District in Bernard v. Foley, but it has 
not yet reached a deterrnination. 199 However, a statutory amendment 
would best clarify the statute and achieve consistency in application by 
California courts.200 The text of Section 15610.17 of the California 
Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides the definition of "care 
custodian" for purposes of Section 21350, should be amended to include 
194 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 15610.17(y) (Deering 2005). 
195 See Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714-16. 
196 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 85-134 and accompanying text. 
198 ld. 
199 Bernard Y. Foley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2005), rev. granted, No. S136070, 120 
P.3d 1050 (Cal. Sep. 21, 2005). 
200 See supra notes 135-165 and accompanying text; see also Bernard, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
724. 
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only professional care custodians.201 A study of the legislative history 
leading up to the enactment of Section 21350 supports a finding that only 
professional caregivers were meant to be included.202 Furthermore, the 
traditional law of undue influence is better suited to govern contests that 
pertain to testamentary transfers to personal friends, who should fall 
outside the scope of Section 21350's presumption of invalidity.203 
Modification of the wording of the definition of "care custodian" would 
clarify that only a professional care custodian falls within its scope,z04 
This would protect the testamentary right to disposition and allow for 
reward of the charitable provision of care given by well-meaning friends 
to ailing elders during their declining years, without sacrificing the 
protection of such vulnerable dependent adults.2os 
KIRSTEN M. KWASNESKI* 
201 See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text; see also Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
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